conditions do they choose to introduce uncertainty i n to an otherwise certain economic environment? One obvious case is where they do not share beliefs.
As in the classical theoretical example of horse lotteries, people who do not agree on probability assessments do nd it mutually bene cial to engage in uncertainty-generating trade.
If the agents involved are Bayesian expected utility maximizers and strictly risk averse, it is not hard to see that disagreement on probabilities is the only way that betting, understood as trade of an uncertain asset, may b e P areto improving when starting from a full insurance allocation.
On the other hand, any such disagreement induces betting. Put di erently, Pareto optimality dictates either that there be no betting in case beliefs are common to all agents or that there be betting in case of disagreement. This is somewhat puzzling, because there is no lack of allocation-neutral, sunspot" sources of uncertainty in the world around us. If every disagreement on probabilities of states of the world suggests a Pareto improving trade, one might h a ve expected to see much more betting taking place.
Rather than believing that people who do not bet necessarily share probabilistic beliefs about anything they do not bet on or, to be precise, share these beliefs up to some slack allowed by transaction costs, we tend to take the relative rarity of bets as a piece of empirical evidence against the Bayesian model. It seems that often people do not bet because they are uncertainty a verse, and they therefore tend to avoid uncertainty that they know little about. It follows that a person's willingness to bet will increase with her subjective con dence in her information and in her likelihood assessments. It is worth emphasizing that Bewley's 1986 motivation for his work on Knightian decision theory was partly this absence of observed widespread betting.
While we do not attempt to argue that the full complexity of betting behavior can be explained by the type of models we study here, 2 we are led to ask, how m uch can be explained by these models if we relax some of the more demanding assumptions of the Bayesian model. Speci cally, we consider maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989 that captures Knightian uncertainty Knight 1921. Assume that such uncertainty a verse agents who are also risk averse, give rise to an economy in which there is no aggregate risk. When does there exist full insurance, i.e., no-bet allocations that are also Pareto optimal?
When is it the case that all Pareto optimal allocations are full insurance?
Is any betting due to di erent beliefs, and, conversely, does a di erence in beliefs always trigger some betting?
In the multiple prior model an individual is characterized by a utility function and a non-empty, closed and convex set of probability measures.
The individual evaluates every act by its expected utility according to each possible probability measure, and chooses an act whose minimal expected utility is the highest. The family of preference relations described by this model strictly contains the relations described by Choquet expected utility with a convex capacity see Schmeidler 1989 .
Consider now a pair of agents conforming to the multiple prior model.
It is an easy extension of the expected utility analysis to show that these agents will not bet against one another if they share at least one prior.
Moreover, in a general framework with more than two agents and complex bets possibly involving several of them, it is easy to show, following Dow and Werlang 1992 early intuition, that Pareto optimal allocations are indeed full insurance allocations whenever agents' sets of priors have a non-empty intersection see, e.g., Tallon 1998 , Dana 1998 . The question of whether the converse to this result holds arises naturally: is commonality of beliefs, in the sense of agents sharing a prior in common, exactly what is needed to explain, within the framework of the multiple prior model, the absence of betting on the many possible sources of extrinsic" uncertainty? Di erently put, is the observation of a Pareto optimal allocation that is immune to sunspots enough to tell us something about the intersection of agents' sets of priors?
It turns out that we can answer this question a rmatively and that the result in the Bayesian model has a conceptually identical counterpart in the multiple prior model. Under the same non-triviality conditions, there exists a Pareto optimal full insurance allocation if and only if all Pareto optimal allocations provide full insurance, and this holds if and only if all agents share a prior probability on the states of the world. In other words, commonality of beliefs is the necessary and su cient condition to explain the absence of betting. Whereas in the Bayesian model sharing a prior" could only mean having an identical prior," in the multiple prior model this phrase may be read as having at least one prior in common." With this grammatical convention in place, the result holds verbatim.
Bayesian agents either agree on probability assessments, or disagree enough to bet against each other. By contrast, uncertainty a verse agents can be in a grey area" between agreeing and disagreeing: they may not agree in the sense of having the same set of possible priors, yet not disagree in the sense of being willing to bet against each other.
Finally, w e emphasize another contribution of this note. In showing that commonality of beliefs is the minimal assumption explaining the absence of bets, we prove a separation theorem for n convex sets that might b e o f interest on its own. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the set up of the model. In section 3 we state the main result and the separation theorem. Proofs are relegated to an appendix.
set-up
The economy w e consider is a standard two-period pure-exchange economy with uncertainty in the second period, but for agents' preferences. The state space is S, and a -algebra of subsets of S, so that S; is a general measurable state space. There are n agents indexed by subscript i. W e assume i that there is only one good, which can be interpreted as income or money; and ii that there is no aggregate uncertainty. T rading an uncertain asset is thus interpreted as betting rather than as hedging. Let BS; be the Banach space of real-valued, bounded and measurable functions on S, endowed with the sup-norm. Let baS; be the space of bounded nitely additive measures on S; endowed with the weak ? -topology. Agent i's consumption C i , is a positive element o f BS; , that is, C i s is the consumption of agent i in state s. Denote by w 2 BS; the constant-across-states aggregate endowment, and assume that w 0.
An allocation C = C 1 ; : : : ; C n is feasible if P n i=1 C i = w. An allocation is interior if C i s 0 for all i, for all s.
In the multiple-prior approach, each agent i is endowed with a utility index U i : I R + ! IR and a set P i of probability distributions over S. U i is de ned up to a positive a ne transformation, and is taken to be di erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. P i is a convex and closed set of baS; . We assume that all priors in P i are -additive. 3 Note that P i is compact in the weak ? -topology since it is a weak ? -closed subset of the set of nitely-additive probability measures on , which is compact in the weak ? -topology see, e.g., Dunford and Schwarz 1958 . The norm-dual of BS; which is isometrically isomorphic to baS; will be denoted B ? S; . The overall utility function V i de ned over BS; then takes the following form:
We assume throughout that all priors are mutually absolutely continuous : 8A 2 ; 8i; j; 8 i 2 P i ; 8 j 2 P j ; i A = 0 j A = 0 This assumption essentially says that all agents agree on null events". It is naturally satis ed if, say, the state space is nite and all measures are strictly positive, or if all measures are absolutely continuous with respect to an underlying measure.
The last de nition we need is that of a full insurance allocation. An allocation C is said to be full insurance if it is constant apart from a set A 2 that has i A = 0 for some and therefore, by the assumption of mutual absolute continuity, for all i 2 P i and i. 4 
the main result
The following theorem states that the set of Pareto optimal allocations and the set of full insurance allocations are either identical or disjoint. Moreover, they are identical if and only if the agents share at least one prior.
Theorem 1 Under the maintained assumptions, the following assertions are e quivalent:
i There exists an interior full insurance Pareto optimal allocation.
ii Any Pareto optimal allocation is a full insurance a l l o cation.
iii Every full insurance a l l o cation is Pareto optimal. iv T n i=1 P i 6 = ;
The intuition for the proof and the role of some assumptions is as follows. We prove that iv ii iii i iv. If there is a common prior iv, one can use strict concavity t o s h o w that a risk bearing allocation is Pareto dominated by the full insurance allocation that equals its expectation at every state, proving ii. 5 This step uses the mutual absolute continuity assumption, as well as the assumption that the probability measures we deal with are -additive rather than only nitely additive.
Observe that with nitely additive measures the implication iv ii does not hold, even in a Bayesian set-up. This is so because the integral of a function with respect to a nitely additive measure may be strictly larger than each of the values the function assumes. Therefore individuals who hold assets that they view as uncertain may not bene t from smoothing them across states. If every Pareto improving allocation provides full insurance ii, the converse iii also holds, since no two full insurance allocations can be Pareto ranked, 6 and it follows trivially that there is at least one such allocation i. Finally, the crucial step and the main contribution of the theorem is that the existence of a full insurance Pareto optimal allocation i implies that there is a common prior iv. This step does not require concavity of the utility index: 7 In proving this last part we make use of the following theorem, which generalizes the standard separating hyperplane theorem, and may b e o f i n terest on its own. In the appendix we also comment on the geometric interpretation of this result which m a y b e viewed as a separation theorem among n convex sets. It is worthy of note that a similar result, developed independently and with a rather di erent motivation, is to be found in Samet 1998 , for subsets of a nite dimensional simplex. Samet's result is weaker in the sense that it guarantees the existence of linear functionals as in our case, but does not guarantee that the separating hyperplanes will intersect at one point p in the convex hull of the sets, and therefore does not yield itself to a straightforward geometric interpretation. Further, Samet's result can be easily derived from the corollary above specialized to subsets of the simplex. It does not appear that Samet's argument could easily be amended to get ours.
Theorem 1 has two immediate corollaries. First, in the Choquet expected utility model with convex capacities, non-empty core intersection is equivalent to some, or all, Pareto optimal allocations being full insurance. Second, in the expected utility case, where the sets of priors are reduced to one point, some, or all, Pareto optimal allocations are full insurance allocations if and only if agents have the same beliefs i.e., the same prior.
Note that even though we cast the argument in the multiple prior model, it should be clear from the proof that a similar result holds for Bewley 1986 approach. In Bewley's approach, agents are also endowed with a set of priors and move a way from a exogenously de ned status quo situation only if the new situation is better than the status quo for all the probability distributions in their set of priors. While Bewley characterizes a partial order over acts, a proposed bet will be preferred to a certain status quo if and only if this preference holds in the multiple prior model of Gilboa and Schmeidler. 8 Our analysis is conducted for an economy with one good. However, the only use we make of this assumption is in arguing that all full insurance allocations are Pareto optimal. Indeed, one can generalize our results to an economy with m goods, with the slight modi cation that full insurance allocations that are considered for optimality be assumed Pareto optimal in each state. We rst prove iv ii Assume to the contrary that there exists an agent, say, agent 1, such that for every 1 
for all i since U i is concave. It follows that V 1 C 1 V 1 C 1 since U 1 is strictly concave. Therefore, the allocation C Pareto dominates C, a contradiction.
To see that ii implies iii, let C be a full insurance allocation. Assume, contrary to iii, that it is not Pareto optimal, and is dominated by another allocation C 0 . By the same argument a s a b o ve, C 0 is at least as desirable as C 0 for every agent. By transitivity o f P areto domination, C 0 Pareto dominates C. But this is a contradiction since both provide full insurance and there is only one good in the economy.
That iii implies i i s o b vious, and it remains to prove that i implies iv. Suppose to the contrary that i P i = ;, and let C be an interior Pareto optimal allocation that is a full-insurance allocation C i is constant for all i apart on a set of measure zero, the latter notion being de ned unambiguously given our absolute mutual continuity assumption. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 2: W e start with the following lemma:
Lemma: Let X be a locally convex linear topological space and let P i X, 1 i n be convex, non-empty, and compact. Assume that in P i = ;
but that for all` n, i6 =`Pi 6 = ;. Then, there exist p 2 co n i=1 P i and a continuous linear functional h i : X ! IR for each i n such that: a 8 i n, h i q , p 0 8q 2 P i b P in h i = 0
The geometric interpretation of this lemma is as follows. Assume that n convex and compact sets have an empty i n tersection, but that every subset of them has a non-empty i n tersection. Then, we can nd a point p which i s not included in any set, but which is in the middle" in the following sense:
one can nd, for each set P i , a h yperplane h i that passes through p which is in the convex hull of the union of the P i and leaves the entire P i on one side, such that the normals of these hyperplanes add up to zero. In the case n = 2, our lemma reduces to a standard separation theorem between two disjoint sets. For n 2, the lemma may be considered as an n-way separation among n convex sets. See gure 1 for an illustration of the case n = 3 .
Please insert Figure 1 here Proof of the lemma: The proof is by induction on n. F or n = 2 , w e have P 1 P 2 = ; and we use a standard separation theorem cf Kelley and Namioka 1963, p.119, theorem on strong separation to conclude that there is a continuous linear functional h : X ! IR and a number 2 IR such that hq for q 2 P 1 and hq for q 2 P 2 . Choose p such that hp = , and set h 1 = h and h 2 = ,h. By linearity o f h it is possible to choose p 2 co P 1 P 2 .
Assume that the lemma holds for every n 0 n . Let there be given P i n i=1 . Set A = i n P i and B = P n . Observe that A and B are convex, non-empty, and compact. Furthermore, they are disjoint since i P i = ;. De ne h n = , e h n . Since , 0, h n q , b p = h n q 0 8 q 2 b P n .
To conclude, set p = b p + q 0 . Observe that p 2 co n,1 i=1 P i and hence p 2 co n i=1 P i . We claim that p and h i in satisfy a and b. Indeed, for every i n, and every q 2 P i : The following two facts, which are used in the proof above, are straightforward and or well-known. i ii. Assume that in P i = ;. Let I be a minimal with respect to set inclusion subset of f1; : : : ; n g with the property that i2I P i = ;. Since n i=1 P i = ;, but P i 6 = ; for every i, such a set I exists and for every such set jI j 2. Apply the Lemma to I.
ii i. Assume that a point p 2 X, a set I f1; : : : ; n g and functionals h i i2I exist as required, and suppose, contrary to i, that there exists q 2 in P i . Then, by a, 
